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Harmon et al.: Patent & Copyright Law

PATENT & COPYRIGHT LAW
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NINTH CIRCUIT
PATENT & COPYRIGHT LAW
Richard D. Harmon*

This issue marks the fifth anniversary of the Ninth Circuit
Survey-a welcome landmark for all who practice in the Ninth
Circuit. I have been privileged to contribute discussions of copyright and patent law to previous Survey issues.· Since it is assumed that the following remarks will be read in light of these
previous discussions, certain recurring themes and background
information will not be restated here.

A.

PATENT

This past term, six patents were reviewed by the Ninth Circuit in published opinions. 2 Five of these patents were declared
invalid for obviousness at the district court level, and each declaration of invalidity was affirmed. One patent was held valid by
a trial court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
invention in question was obvious as a matter of law. 3
It might appear that the Ninth Circuit was harsh on patentees last term, since every patent under review was held invalid.
In truth, however, the number of patents held invalid is an es• Member, California Bar; A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1969; M.A.,
S.U.N.Y. at Stonybrook, 1973; J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 1976.
1. Harmon, Developments in Ninth Circuit Patent Law, Ninth Circuit Survey, 8
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 193 (1977) (hereinafter Developments); Harmon, Patentability:
Obviousness Revisited, Ninth Circuit Survey, 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 139 (1978·79)
(hereinafter Patentability).
2. Norris Indus., Inc. v. Tappan Co., 599 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. July, 1979) (per East,
D.J., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Goodwin and Tang, JJ.);
Lawrence v. Gillette Co., 603 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. May, 1979) (per Merrill, J.; the other
panel members were Trask, J. and East, D.J.); Sateo, Inc. v. Transequip, Inc., 594 F.2d
1318 (9th Cit. Apr., 1979) (per Bright, D.J., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Chambers and Tang, JJ.); Herschensohn v. Hoffman, 593 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
Mar., 1979) (per Carter, J.; the other panel members were Wright, J. and Craig, D.J.);
SSP Agricultural Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979)
(per VanDusen, D.J., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Wright and
Goodwin, JJ.); Safe Stop Brake Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 982 (9th Cit.
Nov., 1978) (per curiam).
3. In Herschensohn v. Hoffman, 593 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1979), the hair brush invention at issue was held patentable by District Judge Laughlin W. Waters of the Central
District of California.

453
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

1

454

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 14
GOLDEN
GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:453

sentially meaningless statistic. If the Ninth Circuit adopts and
applies uniform standards in accord with the patent laws, patent
owners will not be prejudiced, regardless of the number of patents held invalid.
It was submitted the past two terms that the Ninth Circuit
has adopted the appropriate standard of patentability when considering the obviousness of combination devices, and that this
standard has been applied in a consistent manner by the various
Ninth Circuit panels. 4 It is further submitted that these observations can be reiterated this term. For instance, examination of
the five patent cases mentioned above reveals that cases such as
Regimbal v. Scymansky,5 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Tel-Design,
Inc., I and Deere & Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp.7 continue to be ignored in relation to obviousness issues. It is now suggested that
these cases, in fact, play no role in elucidating the Ninth Circuit's contemporary standard of patentability under section 103. 8

Recent Ninth Circuit patent cases also confirm 'that obviousness issues must be resolved by a Graham analysis in all
cases, and that inventions are not evaluated by a double obviousness standard which requires combinations of old elements to
be more non-obvious than non-combination devices.' Therefore,
despite some awkwardly-worded opinions, there are no requirements for "unusual or surprising results" or "synergism" in the
combination context: nonobviousness is the standard, and nonobviousness is to be determined in all cases by a Graham
inquiry.lo
4. See Developments, supra note 1, at 194; Patentability, supra note 1, at 139-40.
5. 444 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1971).
6. 460 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. 513 F .2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1975).
8. For a discussion of these Ninth Circuit cases see Developments, supra note 1, at
W2-03; Patentability, supra note 1, at 140.
9. A combination of old elements refers to elements old in the art. Developments,
supra note 1, at 197. See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 198-212; Patentability,
supra note 1, at 141-42.
10. See Developments, supra note 1, at 204-12. The Ninth Circuit expressly stated
this proposition as this article went to press. Palmer v. Orthokinetics, Inc., 611 F.2d 316,
319-24 (9th Cir. 1980). For an interesting discussion in accord with this author's position,
see Markey, Some Patent Problems Philosophical. Philological. and Procedural. 80
F.R.D. 203, 211 (1979) (Chief Judge, C.C.P.A).
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Obviousness in the Combination Context

Perhaps Satco, Inc. v. Transequip, Inc. 11 best illustrates the
validity of the foregoing observations. In Satco, the district court
held that a combination invention was obvious after observing
that it produced "no synergistic results, i.e., it 'is wanting in any
unusual or surprising consequences'; [and thus] it is not patentable under the test applicable to combination patents."12 The
patent owner appealed, contending that the trial court used "an
inappropriate test of nonobviousness, equating non obviousness
with producing a synergistic result (or 'unusual of surprising consequences'), rather than undertake the factual analysis required
by the Graham case."13
The Satco court did not dispute the patent owner's contentions regarding the standard of patentability. It, therefore, did
not deny that Graham controls obviousness inquiries, and that it
is improper to equate the requirement of non obviousness with
phrases such as "unusual or surprising results" or "synergistic
effects." The court did conclude, however, that the trial court
had not equated the catch phrases of A&P, Black Rock and Ag
Pro with the non obviousness requirement, and thus that the trial
court properly applied the correct legal standards. 14
11. 594 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1979).
12. [d. at 1320, citing Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
13. 594 F.2d at 1321.
14. [d. at 1321-22. For those who were disappointed by the Supreme Court's indiscriminate use of A&P language in Ag Pro to justify a result which could have been supported by a modern Graham analysis, the following passage from THE BRETHREN may be
of interest:
For Brennan's clerks, each lost case was the falling of the
citadel, a catastrophe. One Brennan clerk was frequently
directed to use what Brennan called his "acid pen." As a
result, Brennan's dissents were often written in scathing and
petulant prose. Many of the Justices and clerks believed that
Brennan was overplaying his hand. Increasingly, his opinions
seemed designed not to persuade others but to irritate Burger.
Brennan appeared to have given up trying to do a careful,
scholarly job.
Near the end of the term, the Court heard a case (Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.) involving a patent dispute over a water
flush system designed to remove cow manure from the floor of
dairy barns. Referred to around the Court as the "cow shit
case" it was of no significance, not even pilling interesting
questions in the arcane field of patent law. The conference was
unanimous that there was no patent violation. The case would
ordinarily go to the most junior Justice, Stevens. Instead, Bur-
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In reaching this conclusion, the Sateo court observed as follows: (1) The applicable standard-for both combination· and
non-combination devices-is set forth in section 103, which conditions patentability on nonobviousness, rather than some form
of "synergism" or "unusual or surprising results," (2) federal
ger assigned the "cow shit case" to Brennan.
Brennan was insulted, but he refused to pass along the
humiliation to his clerks. He did all the work on the five-page
opinion himself.
Later, when an insignificant Court of Claims case (United
States v. Hopkins) was argued, Brennan decided to vote
whichever way would leave him in the minority, "so that bastard can't give me cases like this."
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 418-19 (1979). Of course every case becomes significant once certiorari is granted and, therefore, the Woodward-Armstrong contention to the contrary can be attributed to their journalistic bent toward sensationalism.
However, if there is even a shred of accuracy in the above-quoted passage, many of Ag
Pro's inadequacies are explained.
This writer's views on Ag Pro (and Black Rock) are a matter of record. See Developments, supra note 1, at 212-13. It is submitted that these views are still correct. The
Ninth Circuit continues to apply Graham, and views Black Rock and Ag Pro as mere
applications of Graham.
Of course, the Black Rock and Ag Pro Courts did not complete full Graham analyses
because they concluded that neither case involved an invention which even made a
threshold contribution to technology. See Developments, supra note 1, at 204-13 [Ed.
note: the eighth line from the bottom of page 205 should read: "they simply represent an
array of expressions the Court used to convey its conclusion that the invention in question did not even make a contribution."}. Such cases are exceedingly rare, which may
explain why in Black Rock and Ag Pro certiorari was granted in an area which otherwise
receives little Supreme Court attention. With the p(J!sible exception of Astro Music, Inc.
v. Eastham, 564 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1977), an Ag Pro or Black Rock-type case has not
been discussed by the Ninth Circuit in a published opinion since late 1975.
The foregoing analysis is dangerous, however, because it accepts the premise that
there are some rare patent cases where a full Graham inquiry is not required. Such a
premise may be considered incorrect since even a threshold "contribution" determination
is not p(J!sible until after the Graham three-part analysis has been fully conducted. This
position, however, is contrary to the express language of the Black Rock opinion. The
Black Rock Court clearly based its decision on a lack of contribution, and only alluded to
the lack of nonobviousness in the alternative. See Developments, supra note 1, at 206-07.
Black Rock, of course, did mandate strict observance of Graham. Thus, it is submitted that the best way to reconcile Black Rock and Graham is to do as the Ninth Circuit
has done: view Black Rock and Ag Pro as mere applications of Graham (albeit incomplete applications). The factual circumstances which justify less than a full Graham inquiry are so rare that, for all practical purposes, they never arise. Certainly, it would
never be error for a court to proceed on the side of caution in a "close" case and conduct
a thorough Graham analysis.
In any event, the catch phrases of A&P which were reiterated in Ag Pro have no
place in anything other than an A&P-type case. This will permit exclusive reliance on
Graham in every case, as set forth above. If the notion of a short-circuited Graham
analysis for the rare A&P-type case is not accepted, the troublesome language of A&P,
Black Rock, and Ag Pro must potentially be dealt with in every combination case since
no basis for distinguishing them is advanced.
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courts must use the analytical process prescribed in Graham
when "ascertaining whether an invention meets the nonobviousness test of section 103;" and (3) the Supreme Court "has twice
admonished that 'strict observance' of [Graham's] factual inquiries is necessary."15 These observations are refreshing indeed.
It is rare for a Ninth Circuit panel to concisely present such an
able discussion of the standard of patentability in the combination context.
The Ninth Circuit panel displayed equal ability when examining the district court's findings. The district court had arguably applied incorrect legal standards because it adverted to the
catch phrases of A&P in its findings, and failed to "precisely articulate its application of the Graham analysis in deciding the
obviousness issue."18 In light of this failure, the SateD court
looked to substance rather than form, and found, on the basis of
the record as a whole, that the district court had, in fact, conducted a three-part Graham inquiry, since there were findings
relating to each of the three areas of inquiry. The court could
therefore overlook the trial judge's references to the lack of "unusual or surprising results," and effectively treat such references
as inartfully worded conclusions that the invention in question
was unpatentable due to obviousness. Such conclusionshowever ill-phrased-were nonetheless based on a de facto
Graham inquiry, and thus proper. The SateD case clearly
stands for the proposition that "synergism," or "unusual and
surprising results," or the like, are not conditions to patentability in the combination context or in any other context. Nonobviousness is the statutorily defined condition to patentability, and
the exclusive method for resolving obviousness issues is set forth
in Graham. 17
This is not to say that facts relating to matters such as synergism have no place in patent litigation. As the SateD court correctly observed, once a three-part Graham inquiry is conducted,
a legal conclusion must be made regarding "the section 103 condition of patentability."18 And, "in forming [this] legal conclusion, [it is proper to consider] the failure Of that device, which
15. 594 F.2d at 1320-22.
16. [d. at 1321.
17. Accord, AMP, Inc. v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 604 F.2d 24, 25-26 (7th Cir. 1979);
Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 968-69 (7th Cir. 1979).
18. 594 F.2d at 1321-22.
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combines old elements, to create a synergistic result or to disclose any 'unusual or surprising consequences.' "19 Such considerations, of course, are not conditions for patentability in and of
themselves, and may not even be relevant in relation to a given
combination invention. 20
Problems with Terminology

In contrast to Satco's carefully worded opinion, the opinions
in Herschensohn v. Hoffman,21 SSP Argicultural Equipment,
Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd.,22 and Lawrence v. Gillete Company23
each contain one or more unfortunate phrases. Nonetheless,
these generally routine patent cases are consistent with Sat co,
ignore the Regimbal, Hewlett-Packard and Deere cases, acknowledge Graham, do not adopt a doubt-obviousness standard,
and so forth. Thus, uniformity continues to exist in Ninth Circuit patent decisions, despite awkward language in some opinions. It may be useful to identify this language so that it can be
placed in proper perspective and disregarded when appropriate.
In SSP Agricultural, the court noted at one point that "the
elements of the. . . invention are anticipated by the prior art or
are obvious in the light of it."24 The court then apparently discussed how each of the elements of the invention are found in
one or another of three prior art references. 25 Such an analysis
might be relevant to an obviousness inquiry, but not to the
strictly "technical" defense of anticipation, which is only available if every element of a combination device is united in a single
prior art reference in generally the same way to achieve the same
purpose. 28
Anticipation, also referred to as lack of novelty, is a term of
19. Id. at 1322.

20. For instance, there may not be any synergism involved with some patentable
mechanical combinations. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 1, at 208 n.70, and authorities cited therein.
21. 593 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979).
22. 592 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979).
23. 603 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. May, 1979).
24. 592 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 514 F.2d 901, 903 (9th
Cir. 1975). For a survey of cases decided by the Ninth Circuit, including Schroeder, see
Note, Intellectual Property, Ninth Circuit Survey, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 679, 681
(1976).
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art, and should be used with greater care than is evident in the
SSP opinion, which went on the observe that: (1) "[t]he functions [the elements] perform individually and together also are
anticipated by the prior art and no significant new result is
achieved;"27 and (2) "[t]he use of [one of the elements] is anticipated in Upson."28 Not only does it appear that the term antici-,
pation is again being misused, the phrase "significant new result" is exactly the type of rhetorical embellishment which
serves no useful purpose, as the Sateo court clearly understood.
The SSP court also implied that the invention was unpatentable because "the parts of the combination . . . are obviOUS."29 It cannot be overemphasized that section 103's nonobviousness standard is addressed to "the subject matter as a
whole," and that it makes little sense to discuss the obviousness
of individual elements. 3o
The SSP court further complicated matters when it stated
that "[a] mechanical combination must utilize a new principle
or achieve a new result to cause it to rise to the status of invention."31 This passage not only rings of the defunct constitutional
standard of "invention, "32 but it also suggests the existence of a
"new principle or new result" test. 33 Perhaps this language
'n. 592 F.2d at 1101.
28. [d.
29. [d.

30. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); see Developments, supra note I, at 203 n.52, 208 n.66.
31. 592 F.2d at 1101, citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Great
At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152-53; Penn Int'l Indust.
v. Pennington Corp., 583 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1978); Astro Music, Inc. v. Eastham,
564 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1977); and Jeddeloh Bros. Sweed Mills, Inc. v. Coe Mfg.
Co., 375 F.2d 85, 92 (9th Cir. 1967). The Penn case is discussed in Patentability, supra
note 1, at 141-44. The Astro Music case is discussed in Developments, supra note 4, at
210.12.
32. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 4, at 200 & n.37. It may be reasonable to
assume that the SSP court meant to say "patentable invention" rather than simply "invention." If so, the problem warrants continued mention. See, e.g., Developments, supra
note 4, at 200 & nn. 37 & 38, 201, 206 n.62; Patentability, supra note 1, at 141.
33. The "new principle" language presumably originated from Jeddeloh Bros. Sweed
Mills, Inc. v. Coo Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1967). The Jeddeloh court held a patent
invalid because the invention was obvious at the time it was made. The court simply
noted in passing that "[ilt was not necessary ... to seek and apply any substantially
new principle" in order to make the invention. [d. at 92.
Unfortunately, twelve years later in SSP, the Ninth Circuit created the appearance
that it was exalting this useless passage into a requirement that an invention involve a
"new principle" in order to be patentable. Of course, a reading of the SSP opinion as a
whole reveals that the court had no such intention, but nonetheless underscores the im-
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merely reflects the writing style of the opinion's author, and is
not seriously intended to serve as guidance for courts confronting
obviousness issues; such guidance already exists in detail, and is
apparent from a reading of Sateo.
Unfortunately, the SSP court's unsophisticated discussion of
some of the basic features of patent law was mirrored in Hersehensohn and Gillette. An example from each will suffice.
In Hersehensohn, the court stated: "It is obvious . . . that
the patent is not valid, having no new, unusual or synergistic
result, and having no beneficial use other than uses already old
in the art . . . . We also hold [that] the patent [is] invalid for
obviousness."34 There are several difficulties with this passage.
First, by distinguishing between "synergism" and "nonobviousness," the court creates the false impression that these are separate conditions for patentability.35 A close reading of the first
part of the court's opinion discloses that such an impression was
unintentional. Second, continued use of the old language of A&P
and Black Rock only obscures the points which were made by
the Sateo court, and should now be discontinued in favor of the
forms of expression adopted in Sateo. Third, the gratuitous "no
new beneficial use" terminology is an inapt as SSP's "no new
principle" pronouncement, and should be viewed accordingly.
This writer is not aware of any case in which patentability depended upon a "beneficial use other than uses already old in the
art."
In Gillette, the court's desire to be emphatic led to a glaring
misstatement. The Gillette court was obviously unimpressed
with the invention in suit, and thus ended its opinion with this
remark: "The result here was not only to be expected; it was the
porta nee of avoiding inartful phrases such as the "new principle" expression used in Jeddeloh. If this is not done, undesirable results will occur, such as the invalidation of nonobvious (and thus presumably patentable) combinations of known elements and/or
principles.
34. 593 F.2d at 897 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
35. The court justified its use of the word "synergism" by citing Astro Music, Inc. v.
Eastham, 564 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1977) and Austin v. Marco Dental Prods. Inc., 560 F.2d
966 (9th Cir. 1977). Astro Music is an unimportant decision as it merely quoted the catch
phrases of A&P. 564 F.2d at 1238. And, contrary to the Herschensohn court's contention,
Austin is not a combination case. 560 F.2d at 972. ("the Austin Diaphragm valve ...
was a new element"). These authorities do not support the opinion's apparent and incorrect description of the role played by the synergism concept in patent law. See Developments, supra note I, 209-10.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/14
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only possible result."38 This implies that a nonobvious combination of old elements is nonetheless unpatentable if there is only
one possible mechanical result which said combination can produce. Such a notion, of course, never has been and never will be
a feature of the patent laws. 37
The Ninth Circuit patent decisions, on a whole, reflect a
uniform and consistent application of the proper legal standards.
Occasional careless phrases cannot impair this basic fact, but
they can create a certain amount of confusion for the over-burdened trial courts, as the findings set forth in Sateo attest. Accordingly, it may be well to avoid the catch phrases of A&P and
variations thereof (which often are mere substitutes for a proper
Graham analysis), or use them only as they were used by the
Sateo court, and then only with the greatest care.

B.

COPYRIGHT

Last term, the Ninth Circuit considered important copyright
issues in Walker v. University Books, Inc.,38 United States v.
Hamilton,38 Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,40 and Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates. 41 The Walker and Hamilton decisions are
36. 603 F.2d at 69.
37. Once a nonobvious combination is discovered, the results which will be produced
by that combination will often be predictable. See Globe Linings, Inc. v. City of Corvallis, 555 F.2d 727, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Glo'be Linings, see Developments, supra note 1, at 203 n.52.
It cannot be denied that there is a fine distinction involved here. The purpose of
having a level-of-ordinary-skill standard is to insure that no "tools of the trade," or any
expected results obtainable by combining such tools, are taken away from the public
domain and made the exclusive property of anyone person. It is undeniable that a patent which "withdraws what is already known into the field of its monopoly . . . diminishes the resources available to skillful men," and must be invalidated. Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. at 281-82, quoting Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp., 340 U.S. at 152.
However, the statutory standard is still obviousness. The danger inherent in casual
references to "expected" or "possible" results is the failure to differentiate between prospective and hindsight expectations. A result can be the "only possible result" produced
by a combination device, and still be unexpected in a prospective sense. This fact serves
to emphasize the importance of carefully following the steps of Graham's analytical process, rather than resorting to quotable phrases.
38. 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (per Curtis, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Browning and Wallace, JJ.) (rehearing denied).
39. 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. Oct., 1978) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members
were Kilkenny and Sneed, JJ.).
40. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Lucas, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Hufstedler and Goodwin, JJ.).
41. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978) (per Cummings, J.; the other panel members
were Chambers and Anderson, JJ.).
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discussed separately below, and need not be examined here.
Mills and Air Pirates, however, are worth briefly noting.

States are Liable For Infringement
Mills involved repeated infringement of a copyrighted song
by the State of Arizona and one of its agencies.4 2 The trial court
found that the infringing activity was "willful, with full notice
and knowledge of plaintiff's copyrights and in total disregard for
those rights," and thus ruled for the plaintiff.43 The State nonetheless appealed, contending solely that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes an award of damages and attorney's fees against
a state . . . . "44
After deciding that the State had not lost its eleventh
amendment immunity by consenting to the jurisdiction of a federal court,n the panel held that the State had waived its.immunity by voluntarily participating in an activity regulated by federaI law. In other words, applying the standard delineated by the
Supreme Court in Parden v. Terminal Railway,48 the Mills court
concluded that Congress has authorized suit against "any person" who violates the copyright laws, and that this authorized
class of defendants includes any state. 47 Thus, a state in the
Ninth Circuit does waive its eleventh amendment immunity if it
infringes a copyright.
42. The song in question was used as the theme song for the 1971 Arizona State Fair.
The length of time separating the acts of infrinegment and the Ninth Circuit's decision
on February 26, 1979, suggests the need for a judicial response which will mitigate the
harm such delay will otherwise inflict on all litigants. A suggested response is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 65 to 73 infra.
43. 591 F.2d at 1281. For factual background see id. at 1280·81.
44. [d. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend XI.
45. 591 F.2d at 1281·82. A state can waive its immunity by consenting to jurisdic·
tion, but the consent must be unequivocal. In the absence of such consent, a state can
raise an eleventh amendment defense at any time-even on appeal. [d. at 1282. The
panel was obviously uncomfortable with this rule, but felt "constrained" to invoke it in
light of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See 591 F.2d at 1282 n.6.
46. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The Mills court also examined Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) and Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973),
stating that "the Parden· Employees. Edelman trilogy establishes that the Eleventh
Amendment immunity is waived when Congress has authorized suit against a claBS of
defendants that includes states, and the state enters into the activity regulated by fed· .
eral law." 591 F.2d at 1283.
47. [d. at 1284·86.
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At least one circuit has held differently,48 but the result in
Mills is consistent with Parden, sensible in light of the purpose
of the copyright laws, and eminently fair to the owners of copyright interests. As such, Mills is a welcome contribution to the
body of intellectual property law.
Fair Use
In Walt Disney u. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit has significantly clarified and relaxed the fair use standards which had
been previously applied in the parody context in Benny u.
Loew's, Inc., 4V a 1956 decision which the Air Pirates court characterized as "controversial." Many believed that the Benny
court considered the "substantiality of the taking" to be virtually dispositive of any fair use issue, and that the substantiality
test was met by copying, significant enough to constitute infringement. 5o The Air Pirates court correctly pointed out that, as
commonly interpreted, the Benny test emasculated the fair use
defense by having it only apply to situations where it was not
needed, i.e., to situations where there is no copyright infringement due to the minor extent of the copying. 51 The Air Pirates
court salvaged Benny by concluding that Benny only advances a
"threshold test" which "eliminates from the fair use defense copying that is virtually complete or almost verbatim."52 Thus, in
those parody situations involving less than "almost verbatim"
copying, the Berlin test applies. 53 Berlin states that a parodist
may fairly use that amount of the original which is necessary "to
recall or conjure up" the work being satirized, as long as "almost
verbatim" copying is avoided. 54
Although the Air Pirates decision is helpful to the extent
that it neutralizes some of the adverse impacts of the Benny
case, it is far from being entirely satisfactory.55 The greatest diffi48. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962), discussed in Mills Music, Inc. v.
Arizona, 591 F.2d at 1286.
49. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
50. See 581 F.2d at 756-57.
51. [d.
52. [d. at 756-57.
53. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
822 (1964). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 139, 177-83 (1969).
54. 581 F.2d at 757. The Air Pirates court clearly indicated that parody which would
be greatly improved by closer imitation would nonetheless be required to adhere to an
inferior format if such a format nonetheless "conjured up" the object being satirized.
55. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on
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culty with Air Pirates is that it endorses blanket rules, e.g., "almost verbatim" copying is never fair in the parody context. The
case also assigns excess weight to copyright interests as it balances them against society's interest in high quality parody. The
fair use analysis now set forth in 17 U.S.C. section 107 expressly
requires a balancing of factors as opposed to blanket or per se
rules. 58 Moreover, the central factor is the impact the challenged
use will have on the market for or commercial value of the copyrighted work. 57
Considering this central factor in the parody context, it
seems clear that a parody will rarely adversely affect the value of
the works being satirized. Indeed, the attention created by a parodist often stimulates interest in the original work. Parodists do
not deprive copyright owners of the economic benefits of their
monopoly, and therefore do not do violence to the purpose of the
copyright laws, which is to provide an economic inducement for
individuals to publish their creative works. Accordingly, virtually all parody should be considered fair use, regardless of the
"substantiality" of the taking. Social interests would be well
served thereby, while no legitimate copyright interest would be
injured as a result. 58
It should be noted, of course, that Air Pirates and the Benny
threshold test must be confined to the parody context, which the
court acknowledged as unique. In other taking situations-such
as the recent Betamax cases- SII section 107's balancing approach
(with an emphasis on the economic impact on the very work
copied) must be observed. Accordingly, even verbatim and
complete copying can constitute fair use under the appropriate
circumstances. 8o
the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 299 n.84 (1979); Light, Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REv. 615, 635 n.101 (1979).
56. Of course, the Air Pirates court was required to apply the old Copyright Act,

which has no fair use provision. 581 F.2d at 754.
57. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05 [b) [4] (1979).
58. A contrary conclusion would only be justified in Air Pirates if Walt Disney could
have shown that the activities of parodists caused profits from its cartoon business to
drop significantly.
59. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 203 U.S.P.Q. 656 (C.D.
Cal. 1979); Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U .S.P.Q. 809 (N .D. Cal. 1979), discussed
in N.Y. Times, June 5, 1979, Sec. D, at 13, col. 5; Marketing News, Aug. 10, 1979, Sec. 1,
at 11. The Universal and Bruzzone cases are noted in J. LAWRENCE & B. TIMBERG, FAIR
USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRlmrr LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 308-09, 340-41 (1980).
60. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 203 U.S.P.Q. at 683-
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Copyrightability of Characters

An issue that the Air Pirates court did handle well relates to
the copyrightability of cartoon chara'cters. Ever since the famous
Maltese Falcon case,81 there has been some question in the Ninth
Circuit about the extent to which characters are amenable to
copyright protection. In the Maltese Falcon case, the court basically stated that characters are not protectable, unless "the
character really constitutes the story being told."82
The defendants in Air Pirates naturally sought to rely on
this rule. In a somewhat strained analysis, the trial court
avoided the consequences of the Maltese Falcon rule by concluding that Walt Disney characters are part of the stories being told
by these characters.83 On appeal, the Air Pirates court took the
preferred approach of differentiating between cartoon characters
and literary characters of the type at issue in the Maltese Falcon
case. It is quite clear that cartoon characters are essentially visual creations entitled to the scope of copyright protection conferred by the Air Pirates court.B4
C.

CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF STAYING INJUNCTIONS WHILE
ApPEALS ARE PENDING

Patent, copyright, and trademark litigation in the Ninth
Circuit is presently complicated by two important developments:
the use of juries in cases involving difficult issues of fact and
law,85 and the delay caused by this court's crowded docket. 88 The
84; Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. at 812. The BruZ%one case involved
verbatim copying of television commercials by a Betamax, and then selective use of vari·
ous portions of the copies in market research questionnaires. The Bruzzone case is even
more far reaching than the Universal case because the use in Bruzzone was for a commer·
cial purpose, and the market research information made possible by the use was made
available to the competitors of the copyright owner. However, even if this information
aided the competitors, the copying could not have harmed the market value of the work
copied, and thus it was held to be fair. 202 U.S.P.Q. at 812. An excellent discussion
which supports a broad fair use right is contained in Comment, The First Amendment
Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 WIS. L. REv. 1158.
61. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1954).
62. [d. at 950.
63. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 111-13 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Again, it should be noted that a significant amount of time, over six years, elapsed between the entry of judgment and the decision on appeal.
64. See 581 F.2d at 754·55.
65. This is especially true where issues of unfair competition (which are, of course,
irrelevant to issues of patent validity) are arguably available to engender jury sympathy.
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growing trend toward jury trials reflects the belief that jurors will
usually find patents, copyrights or trademarks o7 valid and infringed on the basis of the apparent equities, rather than on the
prescribed factual and legal inquiries, which are simply too difficult and technical for a jury to invoke with precision. os
The pro-patent nature of most juries is rarely discussed lest
one be accused of denying patentees their constitutional right to
a trial by jury. However, oblique references to this fact of life can
be found:
In determining whether to endorse the jury demand on the complaint or wait until a responsive
pleading is filed, there are some tactical considerations involved. There is no question that in particular factual contexts a jury might be inclined
to favor one of the parties on grounds essentially
unrelated to the merits of the controversy. As a
consequence [for example] of an inclination to accept the administrative determination of patentability reflected by the issuance of the patent, a
favorable decision may be more readily obtainable
from a jury than from the court sitting as the
finder of fact. oD

As a result, the party charged with infringement can often expect an adverse ruling if a jury trial is involved, even if a meritorious defense is available. Ordinarily, this would present little
difficulty, even in cases where motions for a judgment notwithOne could argue that the most serious error committed by the patentees in Herschensohn
(involving "literally 'Chinese copies' of plaintiffs' . . . brush") and SSP (involving issues
of trademark infringement) was the failure to demand a jury trial.
66. The court recognizes this in the initial instructions which are provided by the
office of the clerk when an appeal is taken. The clerk's instructions state: "Non·criminal
cases with no statutory priority may wait up to two years for oral argument. (Hopefully,
this time period will be gradually reduced as new judges are added to the court.)."
Clerk's Instructions at 10.
67. For the sake of brevity, the remaining text will explore this topic in the context
of patent litigation. However, the analysis would be similar for all intellectual property
law cases.
68. The Ninth Circuit has noted "that patent suits do not lend themselves readily to
trial by jury for obvious reasons." Shubin v. United States District Court, 299 F.2d 47,47
(9th Cir. 1961). Similar remarks have been made by other courts, but all acknowledge
that the right to a jury trial is inviolable. See, e.g., Reynolds·Southwestern Corp. v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 372 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1967); Railex Corp. v. Joseph GUS8 &
Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 124 (D.D.C. 1966).
00. 3 R. WHITE, PATENT LlfIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS, § 2.02 [61, at 2·20 to 2·21
(1971).
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standing the verdict or new trial are denied, for appellate panels
have demonstrated skill in applying the correct legal standards
to complex factual records. The court of appeals also has the advantage of being fully briefed by the parties on the basis of the
trial transcript, whereas the transcript is often not available to
the trial court during the post-verdict motion stage of a jury
case.
However, what would ordinarily be a manageable problem
becomes unmanageable due to the extensive delay now created
by the crushing work-load imposed upon the Ninth Circuit. The
situation as it now often exists can be described as follows: (1) a
judgment and injunction is entered upon the jury's verdict of infringement; (2) the defendant is prevented from using all devices
covered by the patent in question, often with severely prejudicial
and irreparable economic consequences for the defendant; (3)
several years later the patent is finally declared invalid and/or
not infringed by the court of appeals; but (4) the patentee has
nonetheless fully exploited a monopoly to which he never had a
legal right. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the result
on appeal will be of little more than academic interest to the
parties, that the defendant's right to an effective appeal will essentially be denied, and that the defendant's business will needlessly suffer permanent damage.
A simple and obvious solution to these problems exists in
the form of a stay of the injunction pending appeal. Rule 62(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already provides for a
stay of a money judgment as a matter of right if a sufficient supersedeas bond is filed with a timely lodged notice of appeal. 10
Similarly, the injunction can be stayed under Rule 62(c). A Rule
62(c) stay is not obtainable as a matter of right, but should
nonetheless be routinely granted in a normal case in order to
preserve the right to an effective appeal and avoid irreparable
harm.71
70. "By doing all the acts necessary to perfect an appeal and by giving a proper
supersedeas bond an appellant may obtain a stay as of right." 7 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 11 62.06, at 62-27 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
71. Motions for such stays have nonetheless been denied in recent cases in the
Northern District of California which are now being appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See,
e.g., Carson Mfg. Co. v. Carsonite, Int'l Corp., No. 79-4474 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 1979); VeloBind, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Nos. 79-3338, 79-4448 (9th Cir. July 17,
1979; Aug. f, 1979). However, the position being advocated is strong supported by
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Grabler Mfg. Co., 53 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1931), a patent case where an
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Patent-owners, of course, will object on the ground that if
the judgment is upheld on appeal, continued infringement will
nonetheless occur during the years prior to decision. However,
harm to the patentee can be avoided by simply establishing an
interest-bearing escrow account into which the defendant must
deposit a percentage of the amount obtained from each postjudgment sale of the allegedly infringing device. If the judgment
is affirmed, the patentee will receive all the funds in the escrow
account, and its patent monopoly will remain intact. If the judgment is reversed, on the other hand, the defendant will receive
the escrow funds, and will not suffer the injustice of being enjoined from using technology which it actually had a legal right
to use as it saw fit.
It will be the rare case where use of Rule 62(c) in this manner will prejudice any party. However, serious prejudice to the
defendant will inevitably result in every case where the injunction is not stayed, and the judgment is eventually reversed. 72
This fact strongly militates in favor of using Rule 62(c), especially in light of the problems created by the present delays associated with appeals in the Ninth Circuit.
If a trial judge is disinclined to invoke Rule 62(c) in a given
case, the injunction should, at the very least, be viewed as a preliminary injunction or interlocutory order entered prior to a final
determination on the merits. 73 As such, the patent-owner should
be required to provide adequate security as a condition to receiving injunctive relief which will probably eliminate the defendant
as a competitor for years. This would appear to be the only alternative way of protecting the successful appellant from serious irreparable harm.
injunction was stayed by the court of appeals pending resolution of an appeal.
Vacuum Oil appears to be only reported decision directly in point, and it pre.dates
Rule 62. However, in Western Lighting Corp. v. Smoot·Holman Co., 352 F.2d 1019 (9th
Cir. 1965), a Ninth Circuit panel indicated that the Vacuum Oil rule is proper by stating
that, when an appeal was taken and a supersedeas bond filed, "this effectively stayed the
injunction." [d. at 1020.
72. In other words, even if Vacuum Oil is not considered dispositive, a traditional
Rule 62(c) analysis would support the Vacuum Oil court's position. See, e.g., Reserve
Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974) (granting a stay of injunc·
tion); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (trial courts should
"not lightly deny motions for stays of its orders pending appeals"); 7 J. MOORE'S, supra
note 70, ~ 62.05, at 62·25.
73. See Vacuum Oil Co. v. Grabler Mfg. Co., 53 F.2d at 976.
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II.

ORIGINALITY IN CARTOGRAPHY: THE STANDARD
FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Hamilton, I the Ninth Circuit considered
the standard of originality2 that a map must meet in order to
merit copyright protection. Writing for the court, Judge Kennedy
held that elements of compilation and synthesis, either alone or
considered along with direct geographical observation, may constitute the original authorship necessary to support a map copyright.3 A prior line of cases 4 has restricted maps to a narrower test
or originality, known as the direct-observation rule. As stated in
Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,5 this rule requires cartographers to acquire a significant portion of the information displayed on a copyrighted map by an original geographic investigation of the area depicted. 8 The Ninth Circuit expressly declined
to follow the direct-observation rule. 7
This Note will examine the reasoning of the Hamilton court,
and suggest how the court might have arrived at a clearer and
more practical originality standard.
B.

FACTUAL

BACKGROUND

In 1973, KDB Enterprises, a company specializing in making
maps of the Pacific Northwest, produced and registered for copy1. 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. Oct., 1978) (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were
Kilkenny and Sneed, JJ.).
2. Hamilton was decided under the Copyright Act of 1909, which does not expressly
require originality. Courts have inferred this requirement from the fact that copyright
protection is provided for "all the writings of an author." Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U .S.C.
§ 4 (1970). It is reasoned that a work is not the writing of an author unless it is the original
creation of that author. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.31 (1967). Ct. Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. I 1976) (granting copyright protection to "original works
of authorship").
3. 583 F.2d at 452.
4. Beginning with Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d
Cir. 1951), and followed or cited with approval in County of Ventura v. Blackburn, 362
F.2d 515,520 (9th Cir. 1966); Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314,318 (9th Cir. 1960); Alaska
Map Serv., Inc. v. Roberts, 368 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Alaska 1973); Newton v. Voris, 364
F. Supp. 562, 564 (D. Or. 1973); Carter v. Hawaii Transp. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 301, 303
(D. Hawaii 1961); Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 303, 306 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
aff'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1960); Marken & Bielfeld, Inc. v. Baughman
Co., 162 F. Supp. 561, 562 (E.D. Va. 1957).
5. 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951).
6. [d. at 106.
7. 583 F.2d at 450.
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right a map of Ada County, Idaho.s KDB used an Idaho Department of Highways map as a base, and added information derived
from a variety of sources, including other government maps and
KDB's own previously copyrighted map produced in 1970. Some
of the information on the 1973 map, including rifle ranges, jeep
and motorcycle trails, a landing strip, and other landmarks, was
derived from the personal observations of a KDB employee. 9
Defendant Hamilton was president of United Publishing Co.,
Inc., an Oregon corporation doing business as ADCO. ADCO sold
advertising to merchants, which it placed on the borders of a
map. Copies of the map were left with merchants to be given
away to customers. In the course of this business, Hamilton produced and sold advertisements bearing an exact copy of the 1973
KDB map. Hamilton was convicted by the District Court for the
District of Idaho of willful infringement of copyright for profit,
under the Copyright Act of 1901. \0 Hamilton admitted copying
and selling the KDB map. II The sole contention of the defendant
both at trial and on appeal was that the KDB copyright was
invalid due to a lack of original authorship, and ipso facto could
not be infringed. 12 The Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of both
the copyright and defendant Hamilton's conviction.l 3

C.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The principal issue before the Ninth Circuit panel was
whether the 1973 KDB map had the requisite degree of originality
for copyright protection. In resolving this issue the court consid8. [d. at 449.
9. [d. at 449, 452.
10. Copyright Act, ch. 391, § 104, 61 Stat. 652 (1947) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
506 (Supp. I 1976)) provides, in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully and for profit
shall infringe any copyright secured by this title . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . . " Hamilton is unusual among the map copyright cases in being a criminal prosecution. Compare United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 with United States v. Wells, 176
F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
11. 583 F.2d at 449.
12. A certificate of copyright "shall be admitted in any court as prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein." Copyright Act, ch. 391, § 209,61 Stat. 652 (1947) (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. I 1976)). The defendant then has the burden of
disproving the validity of the copyright. Defendant Hamilton argued that since his was a
criminal case, his burden was only to raise a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the
copyright, the burden then shifting to the government to overcome this doubt. Brief for
Appellant at 23, United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978), citing United
States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959)). The opinion of the Ninth Circuit does
not speak to this question.
13. 583 F.2d at 449.
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ered (1) whether KDB's direct investigation of the terrain was
substantial enough to support the map copyright;14 (2) whether
compilation, arrangement, and presentation, either alone or in
combination with direct observation, may constitute sufficient
original authorship to make a map eligible for copyright protection;15 (3) whether KDB's efforts in compiling the map were substantial enough to qualify the map for copyright;18 and (4)
whether KDB's presentation of new information in its 1973 map,
in combination with its work in compilation, supported the validity of the copyright. 17
Was There Sufficient Direct Observation?

The Hamilton court found that the record before it presented
a close question whether KDB's direct observation, taken alone,
had been substantial enough to support the copyright. IS The prosecution and the defendant differed as to whether added information on the 1973 KDB map had come from direct observation or
from sources in the public domain. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
more than a trivial contribution is needed to satisfy the originality requirement,19 but chose not to decide the close question
whether KDB's observations had in fact been more than merely
trivial. 20
Does Compilation Comprise Original Authorship in
Cartography?

Rather than decide the factual question regarding KDB's
added information, the Hamilton court chose to address the validity of the direct-observation rule, and to decide whether selection, arrangement, and presentation of information may be considered as part of the skilled efforts that constitute a cartographer's authorship.21
1.

The Amsterdam Rule
In Amsterdam, the Third Circuit held that for a map to merit
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

[d. at 450.
[d.
[d. at 452.
[d.
[d. at 450.
[d., citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d

Cir. 1951).
20. 583 F.2d at 452.
21. [d. at 450.
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copyright protection, a substantial portion of the information
depicted must be obtained originally by the cartographer through
the "sweat of his brow."22 The defendant publisher reproduced
the plaintiffs copyrighted map in a Sunday newspaper supplement. The map had been compiled by the plaintiff from other
maps in the public domain. The defendant contended that the
map did not merit copyright protection, due to a lack of original
authorship. The Third Circuit, quoting with "complete accord"
the language of the trial court, held that the exercise of judgment
and discretion in the compilation and presentation of information
in the public domain was not the type of original work needed to
qualify the plaintiffs map for copyright. 23 Original work in cartography was equated with obtaining new information not available from previously published sources. 24 Amsterdam has been
followed in the Third and Ninth Circuits. 25
The Hamilton panel discussed Amsterdam at length. The
court first considered that Amsterdam might reflect a fear that
if a copyright were granted for a map compiled from public domain sources, other cartographers would thereby be denied the
use of those sources in compiling later maps.28 This theoretical
fear was dismissed as being clearly false, since one author's copyright does not prevent another from using the same sources independently to create a similar or even identical work. 27
22. 189 F.2d at 106.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. See cases cited note 4 supra. But see C. S. Hammond & Co. v. International

College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)("The elements of the copyright
consist in the selection, arrangement, and presentation of the component parts," citing
General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1930)). See also Moore v. Lighthouse Publishing Co., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1304, 1309-11 (S.D. Ga. 1977)(the court noted
some confusion in the law concerning the direct-observation rule, but avoided confronting
the issue by finding that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to warrant a
conclusion that the defendant had in fact copied.).
Commentators have been unanimous in their disapproval of the direct-observation
rule. See Whicher, Originality, Cartography, and Copyright, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280, 28992 (1963); Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U. L. REV. 526, 536-38
(1959); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1571-76 (1963); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 18.32 states: "The
fallacy of the direct-observation rule stems from the Amsterdam court's misunderstanding
of the copyright concept of originality."
26. 583 F.2d at 450.
27. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit did not cite cases, other courts have addressed this
point. See, e.g., Fred Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) where Judge
Learned Hand stated:
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The Ninth Circuit next suggested that Amsterdam rests on
the judgment that obtaining data by surveying is the only facet
of cartography sufficiently original to deserve copyright protection. 28 The court saw no persuasive reason for this judgment, but
rather reasoned that direct observation is not the only aspect of
a cartographer's skill and talent worthy of copyright. 29 The court
expressly declined to rule that maps present unique considerations requiring their originality to be judged by a different standard from all other copyrightable classes of subject matter.30
The Hamilton panel expressed an awareness that a cartographer seeking to prove originality under a standard which admitted compilations might, in some cases, have difficulty showing
that a map is the product of an original compilation rather than
a copy of a similar independent work. 31 While this difficulty
might discourage cartographers from undertaking works of compilation and synthesis, the court reasoned that to give no protection at all to such works would clearly be much more discouraging
to progress in the field of cartography.32
Problems of proof under the Amsterdam standard were also
considered. When most of the information depicted on a map
could have been obtained by means other than direct observation, one who independently resurveyed an area would present
evidence of physical investigations similar to that presented by
one who had visited the area only to verify data obtained elsewhere. 33 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since a work resulting
from independent efforts may be copyrightable even though it is
Any subsequent person is, of course, free to use all works in the
public domain as sources for his compositions. No later work,
though original, can take that from him. . . . The defendant's
concern lest the public should be shut off from the use of works
in the public domain is therefore illusory; no one suggests it.
That domain is open to all who tread it . . . .
28. 583 F.2d at 450-51.
29. [d. at 451.
30. [d. The usual rule may be found in the statute: "Compilations . . . arrangements
. . . or other versions of works in the public domain, or of copyrighted works . . . shall
be regarded as new works subject to copyright . . . . " Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U .S.C. §
7 (1973) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. I 1976)). Professor Nimmer has
suggested that the direct-observation rule has the effect of taking maps outside of the
provisions of § 7. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 18.32.
31. 583 F.2d at 451.
32. [d.
33. [d.
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identical to either another copyrighted work or one in the public
domain,34 the resurveyed map would be entitled to copyright
under the Amsterdam standard, while the verified map would
not. 35 The court suggested that while Amsterdam might seek to
protect the work of only those who originally obtain their information by surveying, and not those who conduct surveys solely to
verify data previously obtained, it would in practice be difficult
for courts to distinguish between the two. 3ft
2. The Hamilton Rule
After analyzing Amsterdam, the court discussed the standard of originality applicable in general to copyrightable subject
matter. It noted that originality in copyright requires only that a
work display some element that is the independent creation of its
author,37 and not that it present something novel or unique. 38 As
a general rule oflaw, the court stated that compilation or arrangement is an aspect of authorship that is protectible by copyright,
even when the individual components of the compilation are commonplace and not copyrightable themselves. 3D However, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that the compilation or arrangement
must be more than trivial to pass the threshold of originality.40
Minor elements of presentation, such as choice of colors, symbols,
and key system, were described as falling short of this threshold. u
34. [d. at 451 n.4, citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). Judge Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, held
that "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode
on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not
copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." 81 F.2d at 54.
35. 583 F.2d at 451.
36. [d.
37. [d., citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
38. 583 F.2d at 451, citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
103 (2d Cir. 1951). Contra, Lee v. Runge, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 887 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting; mem.) (arguing that novelty is a constitutional
requirement for copyright as well as for patent). Justice Douglas's dissent is strongly
criticized in Nimmer, A Comment on the Douglas Dissent in Lee v. Runge, 19 BULL.
COPYR. SOC'Y 68 (1971), and in Note, Copyrights: Novelty of Originality?, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 314 (1973).
39. 583 F.2d at 451, citing Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1109-10 (9th Cir. 1970); Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1960); Universal
Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir. 1947); Leon v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1937).
40. 583 F.2d at 451.
41. [d., citing Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878); Christianson v. West
Publishing Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203-04 (9th Cir. 1945). But see text accompanying notes 79
to 87 infra.
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The court noted that maps have been recognized as copyrightable subject matter since the first copyright statute of 1790,
and that earlier cases had considered selection, arrangement, and
presentation to be copyrightable facets of cartography:2 The
court ruled that elements of compilation that are more than
merely trivial may, either alone or considered along with direct
observation, support a finding that a map is sufficiently original
to merit copyright protection. 43 As further support for its reasoning, the court analogized mapmaking to photography, where the
courts have generally held minor elements of presentation, such
as variations in lighting, background, or perspective, to be protectible by copyright. 44 The court argued that cartography should be
treated similarly, by recognizing selection, design, and synthesis
as copyrightable elements of authorship in maps.45
Was There Sufficient Compilation to Support the Copyright?

It remained for the Hamilton panel to decide whether the
work done by KDB in producing its 1973 map was more than
trivial. The court first considered the synthesis of information
from other maps. It found that "the compilation that produced
the 1973 map was the result of substantial creative efforts," and
weighed it "heavily" in support of a finding of originality, 48 but
stopped short of holding that KDB's work in compilation, taken
alone, supported the validity of the copyright. 47
Did the Compilation and Direct Observation Together Support
the Copyright?

The panel next considered the added information gathered
by a KDB employee. Although the prosecution and defense dif42. 583 F.2d at 452, citing General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.
1930); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). See
Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 F. 67, 69 (C.C.D. Minn.), aff'd, 204 F. 921 (8th
Cir. 1912): "The fact that he did secure all this material from other publications which
were not copyrighted does not, to my mind, prevent him from getting a copyright upon
this map, if it constitutes a new arrangement of old materials . . . . "; Chapman v. Ferry,
18 F. 539, 542 (C.C.D. Or. 1883): "[Als absolute originality is not possible in the case of
a map, a person may take material from prior publications, provided he bestows on it such
skill and labor, in revision or otherwise, as to produce an original result."
43. 583 F.2d at 452.
44. [d., citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 141-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. 583 F.2d at 452.
46. [d.
47. [d.
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fered as to whether the employee had obtained this information
by his own observations or from sources in the public domain, the
Ninth Circuit found this issue irrelevant. 48 The court held that
this new information, however it had been gathered, when considered together with the work of compilation and synthesis, made
the 1973 KDB map sufficiently original for copyright. 49
D.

CRITIQUE

The Hamilton court ruled correCtly that compilation and
synthesis are protectible elements of original authorship in cartography. The direct-observation rule has been an unjustified
anomaly in copyright law. 50 As the Ninth Circuit stated, there is
no persuasive reason for holding maps outside of the usual rules
for determining what is copyrightable subject matter.51 Although
there is now a conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits, the
better-reasoned rule of Hamilton, allowing copyright protection
for compiled maps, should be universally followed.
The Ninth Circuit may be praised for the general rule it
established. However, the court's holding on the facts leaves some
uncertainty as to the amount of original work, whether in compilation or direct observation, needed to support a map copyright.
This uncertainty will lead to difficulty in applying the Hamilton
rule to future cases. The court found that "the compilation that
produced the 1973 KDB map was a result of substantial creative
efforts, "52 but rather than holding this to be dispositive of the
originality issue, it only weighed the compilation "heavily" in
support of a finding that the copyright was valid. 53 The court
found it necessary to consider the presentation of new information along with the work of compilation before reaching its conclusion that the 1973 KDB map was copyrightable. 54 There is no
explanation given why the compilation, standing alone, was not
sufficient. Hamilton could be construed as holding that more
than a "substantial" amount of creative, skilled effort in compilation and synthesis is needed to support a map copyright, in the
absence of any information not found in prior maps. Such an
48. [d.
49. [d.

50. See articles cited at note 25, supra.
51. See note 30 supra.
52. 583 F.2d at 452 (emphasis added).
53. [d.
54. [d.
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extreme reading of Hamilton, while consistent with the manner
in which the Ninth Circuit worded its holding on the facts, would
be clearly contrary to the main thrust of the court's reasoning:
that maps should not be excluded from the permissive standard
of copyrightability established for other classes of subject matter.
The leading cases of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 55
and Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,56 cited by the Ninth
Circuit as controlling authority, clearly set a very minimal standard of originality.51
While there are cases that suggest that factual works, such
as maps, directories, and business forms, may be held to a higher
standard of originality than literary and artistic works,58 the
Ninth Circuit rejected a separate standard for maps as
"theoretically unsound."59 Factual works may be distinguished
from literary and artistic works in that their social value lies not
so much in their aesthetic qualities as in their practical utility as
sources of information. 60 What the copyright law seeks to protect
in factual works is not an individual's creative concept so much
as his or her expenditure of money and labor.61 In the case of
55. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
56. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
57. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 250-51; Alfred Bell v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d at 102-03.
58. See, e.g., cases following Amsterdam cited at note 4 supra; Gorman, supra note
25, at 1569 passim (a comprehensive'discussion of the treatment of factual works under
copyright law).
59. 583 F.2d at 451.
SO. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1880):
Of course, these observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste.
Of these, it may be said that their form is their essence, and
their object the production of pleasure in their contemplation.
This is their final end. They are as much the product of genius
and the result of composition as are the lines of the poet or the
historian's periods. On the other hand, the teachings of science
and the rules and methods of useful art have their final end in
application and use; and this application and use are what the
public derive from the publication of a book which teaches
them.
Although maps are both artistic and factual in nature, the courts have considered
their copyrightability to be a reflection of their practical value, rather than their aesthetic
merit. See Gorman, supra note.25, at 1571-76.
61. See, e.g., Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F.
83,88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922):
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended
labor in its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of matters which
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literary and artistic works, courts have shown an extreme reluctance to make judgments of merit. 82 However, in the case of factual
works, for which value is of a more pragmatic nature, courts have
been more willing to evaluate the merit of a particular contribution. 83
The Hamilton court alluded to this dual standard when it
referred to cartography as an "art" and as an "artistic form."84
The court expressly declined to rule that maps present considerations that are distinct from "all other cases"85 and stated that
maps do not need to be judged by rules distinct from those applied to "other artistic forms seeking to touch on external realities."ft8 Clearly the court could not have intended, in disposing of
the facts of the instant case, to reassert a unique standard of
copyrightability for maps.
The confusion between the court's dictum allowing copyright
for compilation and its holding on the facts might have been
avoided by a more precise use of terms. The court used the word
"originality" to denote two distinct aspects of copyrightability:
(1) original authorship (the work must be an independent creaare publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill
or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything
more than industrious collection . . . . He produces by his
labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a
copyright . . . .
62. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251, where
Justice Holmes stated: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."
63. Compare Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d at 103 ("No matter how
poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own.") with Axelbank v.
Rony, 277 F.2d at 318 ("[W]e are unable to say as a matter of law that [plaintiffs] map
involved such a high degree of creation that even if copied by Rony it constituted an
infringement of appellant's copyright.") (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original).
64. 583 F.2d at 451.
65.Id.
66. Id. Although the phrase "seeking to touch on external realities" might be con-

strued as a reference to factual works only, such a construction seems unlikely in view of
the court's later analogy of cartography to photography. Photography is a perfect example
of an artistic form which is directly representative of external reality, but as the Hamilton
court recognized, (see note 44 supra):photographs have been held to a very minimal test
of originality. E.g., Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co., v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F.
932. (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aft'd. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922): "no
photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author,
and no two will be absolutely alike." 274 F. at 934.
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tion rather than a mere copy); and (2) intrinsic merit (the work
must have sufficient value to be worthy of protection).
The requirement of originality is derived from cases which
hold that an "author" must be the person to whom a work owes
its originY In order to be original, a work must be independently
created but need not be novel nor unique in comparison with
other works. os The Bell court discussed this point as follows:
"Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition
of actual copying.' No matter how poor artistically the 'author's'
addition, it is enough if it be his own."eu Thus, as a term of art,
"originality" properly has one meaning, viz., that the work has
not been copied. The Ninth Circuit used originality in this context when it stated that "[o]riginality requires only that ~he
work display 'something irreducible, which is one man's
alone.' "70
"Originality" has been used to denote a separate concept,
that of intrinsic merit.71 This requirement is derived from the
constitutional grant of copyright power to Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts. "72 Courts have
held that a work does not promote progress unless it has some
intrinsic value or usefulness. 73 While this quantum of merit has
been variously described by terms "creativity" and "intellectual
labor,"74 it is also referred to under the rubric of "originality."75
When the Hamilton court stated that "the compilation that produced the 1973 [KDB] map was a result of substantial creative
67. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884). See note 2
supra.
68. E.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,53-54 (2d Cir. 1936);
Fred Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
69. 191 F.2d at 103, quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903).
70. 583 F.2d at 451, quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903).
71. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at §§ 8.31, 10.2; L. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAw AND
PRACTICE §§ 12-19 (1936).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150
F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. Compare, e.g., Andrews v. Guenther Publishing Co., 60 F.2d 555,557 (S.D.N.Y.
1932)(creativity), and Axelbank v. Rony, 277 F.2d 314,318 (9th Cir. 1960) (creativity) and
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 10.2 (creativity), with Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428,
431 (1891) (intellectual labor), and Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)(intellectual
labor), and f M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8.31 (intellectual labor).
75. E.g., Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d at 106; United States
v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d at 452.
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efforts, and we weigh it heavily in support of the finding that the
1973 map was an original work, "78 it was weighing the merit of
the author's work, and referring to that merit as originality.
By distinguishing the question of original authorship from
that of intrinsic merit, the Ninth Circuit might have avoided the
ambiguity that is found in Hamilton. No one denied that KDB
was the map's compiler. Having ruled that compilation is a type
of original authorship in cartography, the court sho~Ild have disposed of the question of intrinsic merit summarily; KDB's
"substantial" compilation was obviously well beyond the de
minimis standard of Bleistein and Bell which the court had approved.
A similar ambiguity is found in the court's statement that
"elements of compilation which amount to more than a matter
of trivial selection may . . . support a finding that a map is
sufficiently original to merit copyright protection."77 When the
court speaks of "sufficient originality," it asserts that the compilation must meet a standard of intrinsic merit. But the court has
already stated that the elements of compilation must be more
than trivial which presumably means beyond the minimal standard of Bleistein and Bell that the Ninth Circuit endorsed,18 If
such elements "may" support a finding of "sufficient originality," the court appears to refer to a second hurdle of
"sufficiency." It appears again to suggest a higher standard of
merit for maps. Had the court said "shall" instead of "may," the
meaning of the rule would be clear. It would mean that compilation is an aspect of original authorship in cartography, and that
compiled maps will be held to the same minimal standard of
merit as other types of copyrightable subject matter.
The Ninth Circuit sought to define by example what might
be a trivial element of compilation and synthesis. The court no~ed
that "it is well-settled that copyright of a map does not give the
author an exclusive right to the coloring, symbols, and key used
in delineating boundaries of and locations within the territory
depicted."78 While the court's example would support a fairly low
76. 583 F.2d at 452.
77.Id.
78. Id. at 451.
79. Id., citing Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878); Christianson v. West
Publishing Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203-04 (9th Cir. 1945).
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standard of intrinsic merit, the cases cited, on careful reading, do
not support the "well-settled" rule that the court ascribes to
them. In Perris v. Hexamer,80 the plaintiff mapmaker used an
original color scheme to denote different types of buildings in his
depiction of a city. The defendant used a similar color scheme in
a map depicting a different city. The court properly held that
there was no infringement, since the defendant's map was obviously not a copy of the plaintiffs. 81 When the Perris court stated
that "it has never been supposed that a simple copyright of the
map gave the publisher an exclusive right to the use upon other
maps of the particular signs and key which he saw fit to adopt
for the purposes of his delineations, "82 it was affirming the principle that copyright will protect only a particular form of expression, and not an idea. 83 While the idea of using a particular color
scheme could not be copyrighted, the decision does not indicate
that if a plaintiff cartographer's original contribution was to employ a detailed color scheme to present information on a map,
that map might be freely copied without fear of infringement.
Such a contribution would be both original and meritorious, and
should be protectible under copyright law.Sf
In Christianson v. West Publishing CO.,85 as in Perris, it was
held that the defendant publisher had, in fact, not copied the
plaintiffs map.86 The Christianson court did not hold that the
plaintiffs map was not copyrightable, but noted that the plaintiff
could not copyright the idea of grouping the states according to
the defendant's National Reporter SystemY As examples of the
dissimilarities which led to its conclusion that there had been no
copying, the court noted that the maps used different color
schemes, and that while one had an explanatory key, the other
did not. There is no holding in Christianson that elements such
as coloring and key symbols are not copyrightable. In misreading
Christianson, the Ninth Circuit unfortunately repeated an error
made by the Third Circuit in Amsterdam. 88
80. 99 U.S. 674 (1878).
81. [d.

82. [d. at 675-76.
83. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. I 1976).
84. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 538.

85. 149 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945).
86. [d. at 203-04.
87. [d. The court held that copyright protection could not extend to the "intellectual
conception apart from the thing produced." [d.
88. 189 F.2d at 106. See also Hengst v. Early & Daniel Co., 59 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D.C.
Ohio 1945).
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By adopting a uniformly low standard of merit, and separating the questions of intrinsic merit and original authorship, courts
would not only avoid a source of ambiguity, but would additionally make the trial of many cases simpler and speedier. Where a
defendant copier asserts as a defense that the plaintiffs work was
not copyrightable, the defense may be based on either a lack of
original authorship in the plaintiffs work, or a lack of intrinsic
merit, or both. If the defendant asserts a lack of original authorship, he is claiming that the plaintiffs work was copied from a
prior source, and has the burden of so proving. se While questions
of degree indubitably arise with respect to copying, there are
many cases where the copying is verbatim, or, in the case of a
pictorial work, photographic, and therefore easily determined. In
less clear-cut cases, the courts have applied an objective test:
whether the author has created a distinguishable variation in the
eyes of an ordinary observer. eo When courts undertake to evaluate
intrinsic merit, however, there are no objective tests to apply, and
judicial standards may vary widely. The trier of fact may have
to choose between the opposing opinions of expert witnesses.91
The more testable question of original authorship should be considered first.
Once it is established that a plaintiffs work is original (not
copied), and that the defendant has in fact copied the plaintiffs
work, the question of intrinsic merit should in many cases be
dealt with summarily. Leading cases have suggested that a defendant's copying is conclusive evidence of the merit of the plaintiffs
work.v2 Courts in these cases have reasoned that a defendant who
89. See note 12 supra.
90. E.g., National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594,600 (2d
Cir. 1951): "Added phrases in a written 'work,' or changes of a few lines or colors in a
pictorial one, may be too trivial to be noticeable by an ordinarily attentive reader or
observer; and we will assume arguendo that in such cases the variant cannot be copyrighted." (emphasis added); Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159, 161
(2d Cir. 1927); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1954): "[Tlhe test
to be applied . . . is whether it was a 'distinguishable variation' . . . [or1 whether he
'contributed' something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably
'his own/"
91. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931): "We cannot approve the length of the record, which was due
chiefly to the use of expert witnesses. Argument is argument whether in the box or at the
bar, and its proper place is the last."
. 92. "That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by
the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 252; Italian Book Co. v. Rossi, 27 F.2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
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pirated another's work should not be able to assert as a defense
that the work was worthless. This reasoning is especially compelling in the case of willful infringement for profit. Although an
innocent infringer93 might have reasonably believed that the work
copied was too trivial to be copyrighted, the willful infringer
knows that the author has claimed a copyright, and has chosen
to disregard that claim. If the willful infringer truly believed the
work to be worthless, then he or she would have believed it possible to recreate the work without any appreciable effort, and
should have done so rather than ignore another's claim of right.
The claim of insufficient merit is usually raised by such an infringer as an afterthought after an, action has been brought. Courts
may properly refuse to hear such a specious defense, which would
shorten many trials.
Although a uniformly low standard of intrinsic merit might
lead to a proliferation of copyrights, it need only be pointed out
that the protection of a copyright extends no further than the
author's original contribution. 94 If some derive pleasure from affixing a copyright symbol to their every opuscule, there is really
no harm done. If an underlying work is in the public domain, the
author acquires no exclusive right to it; the author still must
obtain a license for the use of underlying copyrighted material. 95
As reasoned earlier, a truly insignificant contribution may easily
be independently recreated.
In the case of a map, the courts should uphold the validity
of a copyright to an original map that is the product of any useful
work, either in compilation and synthesis, or in the presentation
'
of new information. 98
1928); Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 765 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894); Ziegelheim v. Flohr,
119 F. Supp. 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
93. An innocent infringer is one without notice or other reason to believe the work
copied was copyrighted. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
94. E.g., American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 834 (2d Cir. 1922).
95. "[Tlhe publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity
of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed
to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works. . . ." Copyright Act of 1909,
17 U.S.C. § 7 (1973) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. I 1976)).
96. "He, in short who by his own skill, judgment and labor, writes a new work, and
does not merely copy that of another, is entitled to a copyright therein; if the variations
are not merely formal and shadowy, from existing works." Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas.
615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.).
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CONCLUSION

By refusing to follow the direct-observation rule in Hamilton,
the Ninth Circuit took a significant step towards correcting the
unjustifiably harsh standard of originality that has been applied
to maps. The court's reasoning supports the conclusion that maps
should be held to the same minimal standard of intrinsic merit
that leading cases have established for other classes of copyrightable works. This is the standard that the Hamilton court in- .
tended, despite some ambiguous language in the holding. Such
ambiguity may be avoided in the future by separate analysis of
the questions of original authorship and intrinsic merit. This bifurcated approach, combined with a uniformily low standard of
merit, will result in easier administration of the law, while maintaining a just and viable system of copyright.
Howard Klepper*

III. PRELIMINARY COPIES: ACTIONABLE
INFRINGEMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Walker v. University Books, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit, addressing a question of first impression, held that blueprints of a
final product protected by copyright are "infringing" copies
under the 1909 Copyright Act (the Act).2
The plaintiff in Walker had copyrighted and published a set
of seventy-two "I Ching Cards."3 The cards were designed to aid
in the use of the fortune-telling system described in the I Ching,
a work in the public domain. 4 In response to defendant University
Books' interest in distributing her cards, plaintiff sent the defendant a sample deck. The defendant then proceeded to produce
and distribute its own set of cards, based on plaintiffs cards,
• Second Year Student, Boalt Hall.
1. 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. Sept., 1979) (per Curtis, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Browning and Wallace, JJ.).
2. [d. at 864.
3. The validity of the copyright was not at issue. Id. at 861.
4. Plaintiffs cards were based on the James Legge translation of the 1 Ching (Book
of Changes), a Chinese text on divination. The cards were illustrated with English and
Chinese words and figures and with instructions. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 193
U.S.P.Q. 596, 599 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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without plaintiffs authorization. 5
The blueprints were prepared by the defendant as proofs of
the art work to appear on the finished set of cards.' The issue of
whether they constituted infringing copies arose because by the
time the defendant had produced and manufactured the finished
set of cards, the plaintiff no longer held the copyright. 7
In awarding summary judgment to the defendant, the district court held that the blueprints did not constitute infringing
copies and that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages because
"[a] copy is a tangible reproduction of a work not a mere blueprint preliminary to production."8 The Ninth Qircuit held this
conclusion in error and reversed the grant of summary judgment. 8
5. Plaintiff also brought suit against Noble Offset Printers, Inc. and Felix Morrow
for unfair competition. She alleged that they misappropriated trade secrets by disclosing
to defendant University Books her suggested improvements for the cards, which she had
discussed with them in confidence. The court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants on the trade secrets claim on the basis that the improvements
did not constitute trade secrets. 602 F.2d at 865.
6. Plaintiff learned of defendant's intention to infringe on her copyright when she
obtained an advertising flyer, put out by University Boo~s' distributor, which announced
the upcoming publication of "I Ching Cards" based on the James Legge translation of the
[Ching. Her attorney wrote to the distributor and warned that the announced publication
would infringe on plaintiffs copyright. The distributor replied by letter on March 8, 1972,
denying the infringement and attaching copies of the blueprints, apparently to demonstrate how different defendant's version of the cards was. [d. at 861.
7. Plaintiffs original suit included claims for unfair competition and for defendant's
sales and distribution of their version of the cards. The unfair competition claim was
dismissed. See note 5 supra. The claim based on defendant's sales and distribution was
also dismissed because plaintiff had no standing to sue. Plaintiff assigned the copyright
on March 2, 1972. The assignee subsequently forfeited the copyright through failure to
affix the copyright notice. University Books did not begin to sell and distribute its version
of the cards until May, 1972, three months after the assignment. The court held that
plaintiff lacked standing to sue once she lost ownership of the copyright through assignment. 602 F.2d at 862. The blueprints, which plaintiff received on March 8 and which
arguably existed prior to March 2, thus constituted the only infringement for which
plaintiff had standing to sue.
8. 193 U.S.P.Q. at 602 (emphasis added).
9. 602 F.2d at 863, 864. The court was careful to limit its holding: "Our holding is
thus limited in scope and we reverse the district court only as to this proposition [that
the blueprints could not, as a matter of law, constitute infringing copies] upon which the
grant of summary judgment as to infringement prior to March 2, 1972 was based." [d.
Thus, at trial plaintiff would still have to show that the blueprints had in f~ct existed
before March 2, see note 7 supra, and that the defendant's cards were substantially similar
to her work in order to present a prima facie case of infringement. The defendant had
conceded the other necessary element, access to the protected work. [d. at 864.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INFRINGING COpy

The Ninth Circuit correctly rejected the district court's cursory analysis of the blueprint issue. The district court casually
disposed of the issue by declaring: "Plaintiff has cited no authority, nor is the Court aware of any, which holds that the existence
of plans, preparations or blueprints of a final product constitutes
copying which would give rise to liability for damages."lo The
Ninth Circuit held that this analysis gave unwarranted weight to
the stage of production toward a final, infringing product. The
district court assumed that until the infringers completed production, no copying could take place as a matter of law.
Acknowledging that the issue of whether preparatory copies
could constitute infringing copies had never been decided in previous cases,l1 the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's holding. In its own examination of the issue, the Ninth Circuit correctly applied traditional copyright principles. The court noted
first that the district court's analysis ignored the fact that a blueprint is itself a tangible and perceivable expression. A blueprint,
therefore, qualifies as a copy of the protected work, since a copy
need only "consist of some tangible material object upon which
the work is 'fixed"'12 and that "in some manner, take[s] on the
10. 193 U.S.P.Q. at 602.
11. 602 F.2d at 863.
12. [d. The court cited C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
for this proposition, but that case is inapposite. The court also cited 2 M. NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 8.02 (b) (1979). Professor Nimmer used C.M. Paula to illustrate his contention that the current Act's definition of "copy" as the embodiment of the work in a
material object, see note 13 infra, is a continuation of earlier case law. In the three cases
that Professor Nimmer cites-C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.
1973); Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Smith v.
Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744,345 P.2d 546 (1959)-the courts focused on whether a defendant who utilizes a purchased copy of plaintiffs work in his own product thereby infringes.
The real issue presented was not whether the work was embodied in a tangible object but
whether the defendant copied or reproduced that work.
In C. M. Paula, for example, the defendant affixed the design from plaintiffs copyrighted stationery onto his own ceramic plaques. The court held that he had not ther~by
infringed because he had not copied plaintiffs work. 355 F. Supp. at 191. In Blcizon. the
court held that a defendant who displayed plaintiffs hobbyhorse did not thereby copy the
hobbyhorse. 268 F. Supp. at 420. These holdings depend in part on the fact that "[tJo
print, reprint, publish and copy are continuing rights throughout the life of the copyright,
but the right to transfer or vend. . . is exhausted as to particular copies once the proprietor has disposed of them unrestrictedly at his own price. . . ." H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT
LAw 120 (3d ed. 1952).
The Walker court only cited C. M. Paula, and of the three cases it is the only one that
does not address the "material object" requirement at issue in Walker. The court in Smith
u. Paul, on the other hand, noted that "the noun 'copy' ordinarily and as used in the
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physical aspects of the protected work such that the' copy' of that.
work may be perceived by an observer."13
The court focused on two basic principles of copyright law.
First, there is no requirement that a copy be expressed in the
same medium as the original work to be an infringement of that
work." Thus a motion picture may infringe on the play upon
which it is based,15 or a three-dimensional ornament may infringe
upon a two-dimensional illustration of that ornament. 16
The different-medium principle has previously been applied
only in cases where the copy was the final product rather than a
preliminary step}? This application, however, does not limit the
principle to final-product copies only. As the court noted, "the
question is not whether the Appellees utilized the blueprints as
merely a step in the manufacture of their cards but whether they
unauthorizedly utilized Appellant's work in the manufacture of
their blueprints."ls Thus, regardless of the final use to which the
preliminary copy is to be put, it can constitute a per se infringing
copy.
The second principle is also a traditional one: there is no
requirement that the copy be sold for profit to give rise to damages for infringement. IS The Act specifies statutory "in lieu" damcopyright cases signifies a tangible object that is a reproduction of the original work," 174
Cal. App.2d at 755-56, 345 P.2d at 553, and the court in Blazon based its holding in part
on the fact that "insofar as the right to copy is concerned, there is no 'tangible object that
is a reproduction of the original work'; in fact there has been no reproduction whatsoever."
268 F. Supp. at 434 (citation omitted). Either of these cases would have been better
authority for the court's proposition in Walker than C.M. Paula.
13. 602 F.2d at 864. The holding and analysis of the court would not be changed by
the new Copyright Act, effective January 1, 1978. The old Act did not define "copies."
See Manes Fabric Co. v. Celebrity Inc., 246 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). According to
Professor Nimmer, the definition of "copies" given in the new Act merely codifies existing
judicial interpretation, see note 12 supra. The new Act defines "copies" as follows: " 'Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fIXed by a method
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be preceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C.
o 101 app. (1977).
14. 602 F.2d at 864.
15. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 8.01 (B).
16. Walco Products, Inc. v. Kittay & Blitz, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
17. Both the district court, 193 U.S.P.Q. at 602, and the Ninth Circuit, 602 F.2d at
863, recognized that there exist no previous cases establishing that a preliminary copy
constitutes an infringing copy. As to the different-medium principle, see generally 2
NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 8.01 (B); H. HOWELL, supra note 12, at 121-22.
18. 602 F.2d at 864.
19. [d.
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ages for cases in which the infringement does not give rise to
actual damages. 2o Thus, the fact that the defendant in Walker did
not sell the blueprints-but only used them to produce cards
which they did sell-did not defeat a claim for damages based on
the blueprints alone.
20. The specific provision in the 1909 Act is 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b) app. (1970), which
reads in pertinent part:
If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable:

(b) Damages and profits; amount; other remedies
To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the
copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such infringement. . . or in lieu of actual damages
and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just
. . . and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum
of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be
regarded as a penalty.
The new Act contains a similar provision at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1977), which provides
in pertinent part:
(a) In general
Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of
copyright is liable for either(1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, a8 provided by subsection
(c).

(c) Statutory damages
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at any time before
final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for
all infringements involved in the action, with respect to
anyone work, for which any two or more infringers are
liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $250
or more than $10,000 as the court considers just.
These provisions reflect the policy behind the statutes: In Hedeman Products Corp.
v. Tap-Rite Products Corp., 228 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1964), the court stated: .
The statute is designed not only to take away an infringer's
profits and to remedy the injury to the copyright proprietor, but
also to discourage such infringement even if it is noninjurious
or unprofitable . . . . The "in lieu of actual damages" provision may be applicable where there is no showing as to any
actual loss . . . when proof of damage is difficult or impossible
. . . or where, even if some damages have been proven, the trial
court, in its discretion, determines it would be "more just" to
allow a recovery based on the statutory formula.
[d. at 635 (citations omitted).
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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR PREPARATORY INFRINGEMENT

The decision in Walker has important implications for copyright holders who have proof of infringement before wide-scale
marketing by the infringer has begun. In most cases, actions are
initiated after the damage has been done-after the infringer has
produced and distributed the copies and has consequently cut
into plaintiff's potential market. 21 Under Walker, a copyright
holder can sue at an earlier stage.
The reason for such a suit would not be the collection of
damages, since recovery would be limited to statutory minimum
damages 22 in most cases, but for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. In a suit for preparatory infringement, the copyright
holder must make a prima facie case for infringement.23 That is,
the plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she is the owner of a valid
copyright;24 (2) that the defendant had access to the protected
work;25 (3) that there exists a substantial similarity between the
protected work and the preliminary copy;2I and (4) that the preliminary copy is sufficiently tangible, perceivable, and permanent to qualify as a "fixed" object.27 In Walker the fourth requirement was met by blueprints; in other cases it might be met by
page proofs, sketches, mock-up designs, or molds.
If the plaintiff makes this prima facie showing, he or she will
21. Since most actions are initiated after damage has occurred, Walker illustrates the
court's acknowledgement that preparatory copies, like the blueprints in Walker, constitute infringing copies. 602 F.2d at 863.
22. The minimum statutory damages under both the old and new Acts are $250. See
note 20 supra. The Walker district court noted that "[mlere copying without resulting
gain or profit on the part of defendant or specific damage on the part of defendant would
probably result in a minimum damage award of $250 . . . . " 193 U.S.P.Q. at 602 n.4.
23. Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). The requirement is sometimes described as being a
burden on the plaintiff to show "a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits."
Greeff Fabrics Inc. v. Malden Mills Indus., 412 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1976), quoting Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp.,
409 F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). See generally Latman, Preliminary Injunctions in Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Cases, 60 Tiw>EMARK REP. 506 (1970).
24. Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 193 U.S.P.Q. at 601. See also Greeff Fabrics Inc. v.
Malden Mills Indus., 412 F. Supp. at 162.
25. 602 F.2d at 864.
26. [d.
27. Id. A mere plan to copy, short of an embodiment of the plaintiffs work in a
tangible object, is not an actionable infringement. Thus, for example, an in-house memorandum outlining a company plan to infringe does not, of itself, constitute copying for the
purposes of copyright infringement.
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generally obtain a preliminary injunction. 2K If the plaintiff prevails on the merits in the subsequent trial for statutory damages,
he or she will generally also secure a permanent injunction
against the infringers.2B Such a result would preserve the market
for the copyright holder's own distribution and sales of his or her
own work.
There are two potential obstacles to bringing an action for
injunctive relief. First, evidence of preliminary copies may not
always be so easy to discover as it was in Walker.30 Second, the
preliminary copy may not pass the "substantial similarity" test 31
as easily as a finished copy would. Nonetheless, where a copyright
holder is able to obtain evidence of infringement, the ruling in
28. See note 23 supra.
29. Under the old Act, preliminary and permanent injunctions against infringers were
provided for under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (a) and § 112 (1970). Section 112 provides in pertinent
part that the "court . . . shall have power, upon complaint filed by any party aggrieved,
to grant injunctions to prevent and restrain the violation of any right secured by this title,
according to the course and principles of courts of equity, on such terms as said court or
judge may deem reasonable."
The new Act, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (a) app. (1977), the statute provides in pertinent part:
"Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . . grant
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright." See generally Strauss, Remedies Other Than Damages for Copyright Infringement," in GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
STUDY (1959).
30. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
31. In order to constitute an infringement of the copyright holder's right to copy or
reproduce the protected work, the copy must be substantially similar to the protected
work. The Walker court noted that where the defendant's access to the plaintiffs work is
uncontroverted, as it was in Walker, "proof of actual copying. . . is often attained by a
demonstration . . . [that] the similarity between the two works is such that no explanation other than copying is reasonable plausible." 602 F.2d at 864.
One commentator states:
[T]he determination of the extent of similarity which will constitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents
one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one
which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations. It is
clear that slight or trivial similarities are not substantial and
are therefore non-infringing. But it is equally clear that two
works may not be literally identical and yet be found substantially similar for purposes of copyright infringement. The problem, then, is one of line drawing. Somewhere between the one
extreme of no similarity and the other of complete and literal
similarity lies the line marking off the boundaries of
"substantial similarity."
3 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13.03 (A) (citations omitted). For a discussion of
elements to be considered in the determination ofsubstantial similarity, see generally, 3
M. NIMMER, supra note 12, at § 13.03 (A)-(E).
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Walker supports an action before real damage to plaintiff has
been done.

D.

CONCLUSION

In holding that an unauthorized copy of a protected work is
not disqualified as an infringing copy solely because it is a preliminary or preparatory copy, the Ninth Circuit in Walker v. University Books, Inc., correctly applied traditional copyright theory
by allowing those who have evidence of preliminary copying to
obtain injunctive relief before the infringer has invaded their potential market.
Paige L. Wickland
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